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OBJECTNES

The brief begins by emphasizing the growing importance of electromagnetic survivability and compatibility. Next,
the brief considers factors which pose implementation challenges/problems. While many technical questions will
need to be resolved, the major challenges are associated with organization and process given the large number of
technical disciplines and organizations involved. The last part of the brief proposes a top-level solution path.
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OBJECTIVES

BakBrIDNA(2) 10- 14-93 WD43

•

Review importance of electromagnetic
survivability I compatibility

•

Identify current implementation challenges

•

Propose OSD-Ievel solution path

"

BACKGROUND

Operation Desert Storm demonstrated the clear military advantage provided by sophisticated electronic weapon and
C4I systems. In addition, the offensive tactic of taking out the enemy's eyes and ears during the air war paid off,
giving us decisive air superiority. The lessons for the future are clear. High-tech electronics now so dominates the
battlefield that the outcome of future conflicts could well be decided by electronics attrition rather than human
casualties. Our Desert Storm experience thus accentuates the importance of guaranteeing that our electronic systems
will not be disabled either deliberately or accidentally by electromagnetic environmental effects.
The increasing use of commercial equipment in military applications will require that commercial and military
standards be integrated to some degree.
Recognizing the growing importance of electronics survivability, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J6) has requested and
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition has tasked the development of Combined Battlefield Environmental
Effects (CBEE).

BACKGROUND
•

DESERT STORM proved criticality of sophisticated electronics to
U.S. military operations

•

Rapid deployment strategy places even higher premium on
electronic control

•

Outcome of future conflicts could be determined by electronics
attrition

•

Must take steps to ensure that our electronics will not be disabled by
intentional or inadvertent means

•

Integration of commercial and military standards could result in
markedly improved
.
.
Cost effectiveness
Uniformity and consistency of E3 protection
Control and audit of E3 activities

•

JCS has requested combined battlefield effects standard
(including E3, NBC)
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ELECTROMAGNETIC ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS (E3)
The simple definition of E3 is "the sum total of electromagnetic environments in which a system must live and
operate." A multitude of individual effects contribute to this environment. Sources of these environments are both
man-made and natural. Man-made environments can be friendly or hostile. The large number of potential sources
complicates the environments definition problem. The formidable list of more traditional environments (EM I,
lightning, ESD, EMP, HERF, TEMPEST, EW) is lengthened by emerging threats from high power microwave and
ultra-wide band electromagnetic technologies. Many of the operative environments overlap in the frequency and
amplitude of the electrical stresses they create.
At present, the system acquisition process does not treat electromagnetic environmental effects in an integrated
manner. This results in duplication of effort, inconsistencies, and increased cost to protect and validate systems.

II

ELECTROMAGNETIC
ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS (E 3 )
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E3 INTERRELATIONSHIP

The list of operative effects is long and are shown separated according to nuclear and non-nuclear.
Nuclear weapons create a variety of very intense transient electromagnetic effects on systems on the ground (HEMP
from high altitude bursts and SREMP from surface bursts) and space (SGEMP from directly impinging ionizing
radiation and DEMP from dispersed electromagnetic fields). Electromagnetic fields induced by nuclear weapons
can range up to 1oo's of kilovolts per meter. Nuclear survivability requirements exist for high-value military
systems. The protection measures are conservative and stringent. Evidence exists that measures employed to achieve
nuclear electromagnetic survivability may suffice for protecting systems against many non-nuclear effects.
Check-marks denote those environments that could be treated by a combined effect protection design. We must
limit our attention to disciplines amenable to readily defined protection engineering techniques, thus Spectrum
Management and Electronic Warfare (in band ECMlECCM) are considered beyond the scope of the proposed effort.

, .,

E3 INTERRELATIONSHIP
Nuclear Requirements

Nonnuclear Requirements

~ HEMP (E1, E2, E3)

~

~ SREMP

~

~

~

SGEMP/IEMP
~ DEMP

~
~

~

~

~

EMI/EMC
Lightning
ESD
TEMPEST
EMR
RF Hazards
HPM/UWB
ECM I ECCM (out-of-band)
ECM I ECCM (in-band)
Spectrum Management

~ Candidates for inclusion in an integrated protection approach
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WAR FIGHTING TREND TOWARD EXPLOITING ELECTRONICS VULNERABILITIES
A major objective of command and control warfare (C2W) is to separate the enemy leadership from his forces. In
future conflicts, offensive measures would be employed to destroy, deny, degrade, confuse, or deceive a
combatant's capabilities to communicate, sense, reconnoiter, classify, target, and direct an attack. Disruption of
electronics is an effective means of accomplishing these objectives. Systems particularly susceptible to E3 problems
include command centers, communications systems, surveillance and targeting systems, information processing,
decision and display systems, electronic warfare systems, and weapons guidance systems. The proliferation of
advanced digital and analog electronic information systems makes electronic systems more and more vulnerable
to disruption by extraneous electromagnetic sources. The problem is made worse by new defense guidance requiring
that off-the-shelf commercial-spec electronics be used whenever possible. Given the continuing increase in the
sophistication and capability of electronics on the battlefield and commensurate increase in military reliance on such
electronics, the effects of E3 disruption of electronic means can have a larger and larger effect on the outcome of
future conflicts. Thus, a strong need exists to protect our electronics. Requirements need to be made uniform and
enforceable through stricter controls on design, manufacturing and test requirements.

,
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WARFIGHTING TREND TOWARD
EXPLOITING ELECTRONICS
VULNERABILITIES
•

Separate leadershi·p from forces

•

Targets are electronic technologies embedded in
- Precision guided munitions
- Space-based systems
- High-speed decision aids
C2

-
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•

Control enemy use of the electromagnetic spectra

•

E3 protection becomes critical
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E3: CONSEQUENCES CAN BE SERIOUS

The are several documented incidents where E3 resulted in serious accidents, some of which involved injuries
and/or fatalities. The Blackhawk and Apache helicopters have experienced operational problems around high
intensity RF sources. An Atlas Centaur FLTSATCOM launch was aborted just prior to launch initiation due to
lightning strikes in and around the launch complex. A Pershing n missile detonated in Aldheide Germany in an
accident attributed to charge build-up in the motor case. A Tornado aircraft crash was attributed to interference
from a nearby radio tower. During the Vietnam era, a very serious accident occurred on board the Forrestal aircraft
carrier in which RF fields caused an accidental missile launch. The accident caused extensive destruction and loss
of life. Other classified incidents have been documented.

E3: CONSEQUENCES CAN BE SERIOUS

•

Helicopter operation irregularities in high-radio-frequency
(RF) environments (BLACK HAWK, APACHE)

•

ATLAS CENTAUR abort during FLTSATCOM launch

•

PERSHING 2 detonation in Waldheide

•

TORNADO crash near Munich

•

Boeing 747 thrust reverser deployment

•

Forrestal incident

•

Other classified incidents
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SYSTEM E3 CONCERNS
Within systems, E3 can have many different effects on operation from safety to data loss to false/misleading system
status information. As more and more of system functionality has been turned over to electronics, the effects of
electronics deliberation on mission execution have become more serious. As one example, newer aircraft are using
electronic controls in place of traditional mechanical subsystems (including "fly-by-wire" subsystems) making them
more vulnerable to E3. Indicative of the sensitivity of these systems to E3, starting in 1993 commercial airliners
have banned the operation of certain electronics on ·board aircraft due to incidents of severe interference with
avionics operation.
Other notable examples of increased military dependence on electronics and a corresponding increase in E3
susceptibility include remote sensing and smart munitions. Remote sensing is highly dependent on electronics of
increasing sophistication. The sensors may include focal plane arrays, RF transmitter-receivers, and lasers. These
sensors need to fit into small volumes and rely on microminiature electronics that have been shown to be extremely
sensitive to the electromagnetic environment. Electronics provide the "smart" in smart munitions. If appropriate
protection is not afforded, these systems are known to be susceptible to E3 especially during the latter part of their
mission since it is during this time that there is little or no possibility of manual recovery.

E3 is an important consideration for military electronics across the board. The chart shows a sample of functional
categories, the effects that upset or damage to the associated electronics can have, and an example of an affected
system class. Of critical concern are functions/systems where safety is affected. On the battlefield, all listed
concerns may lead to actual casualties.

"

SYSTEM E3 CONCERNS

FUNCTIONAL CATEGORY

CONCERNS

RELEVANT SYSTEM
CLASSES

Fly-by-wire

Safety

Modern aircraft systems

Remote sensing

Data loss

Target acquisition

Fire and forget; fuzing

Performance degradation

Advanced munitions

Remote control

Mission abort

RPV/robotics

Jam-resistant C3 1

Timing; sync

C3 1

Position location, tracking

Data loss

C3 1/RSTA

Ordnance

Safety/mission abort

Electrically initiated ordnance

Guidance and control

Performance degradation

All guided weapons

Information processing

Data loss

C3 1systems

Weapon simulation

False response

Training devices
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UNIFIED ELECTROMAGNETIC EFFECfS WORKSHOP EXECUTIVE PANEL FINDINGS

DNA and the Army organized this workshop at the Naval Postgraduate School in October 1991. The workshop
brought together experts from the major EM disciplines to consider a unified approach to protecting U.S. military
systems. The sequencing of session presentations and discussions was designed to (1) identify protection
requirements for emerging EM effects; (2) review how requirements have been met for existing EM effects; (3)
identify protection and test technology capabilities and limitations; and (4) consider how best to combine system
EM protection requirements. An Executive Panel comprised of representatives from the Army, Navy, Air Force,
Defense Nuclear Agency, Strategic Defense Initiative Office, and industry convened on the last day of the
workshop.
The panel concluded that unification of electromagnetic effects protection is not only feasible, but necessary. The
panel felt that the technology required to provide the required protection is well in hand, that the major challenge
will be to improve the process and organization. Panel members were convinced that there is much room for
improvement in the present DoD E3 policy and process.
The panel made a number of specific recommendations on future steps to achieve a combined, coherent DoD
approach:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Define a common set of tenninology.
Review existing hardening specifications, standards, and guidelines to identify overlaps and incompatibilities.
Whenever possible, integrate hardening design guidelines/procedures/processes to handle multiple environments.
Establish minimum requirements for reporting during the system acquisition process regarding how E3
protection will be achieved and verified.
5. Develop a top-level road map document as a guide to all existing E3 documentation.
6. Establish a DoD/industry working group to provide E3 input to the revision of DoD-1-5000.2.
7. Assure that future EM simulation facilities address E3 issues and consolidate test facilities and capabilities.
8. Define "low-risk" protection in a more general context.
9. Establish procedures to define and incorporate "new" E3 threats.
10. Establish an E3 hardening data base.

,
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UNIFIED ELECTROMAGNETIC EFFECTS WORKSHOP
EXECUTIVE PANEL FINDINGS (OCTOBER 1991)

•

Much commonality among EM .effects

•

E3 protection integration (programmatic and technical) is not
only doa~le but highly desirable
Necessary technology is in hand
Challenge is to define process

•

Need for focus within 000
Designated OPR
Top-down OSO guidance
Flow-down to services, PMs in consistent manner
Uniform terminology I standards I direction ...

•

Need to address emerging threats (HPM, UW8)
Hostile
Friendly
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CHALLENGE: MULTIPLICITY OF ENVIRONMENTS

A major challenge is to interrelate all applicable EM environments with the goal of combining any overlap while
eliminating any significant over- or under-specification. As shown by the examples in this table there are a
multiplicity of specifications for EM environment. To a certain degree it may be possible to combine a few of these
specifications where the important defining parameters tend to overlap without over or under specifying anyone
environment. This is indeed a difficult challenge, but one that is worthy of consideration.
The environment sources are divided into hostile and non-hostile classes and are further subdivided into nuclear
and non-nuclear and into natural and manmade environments, respectively. The hostile non-nuclear environments
include UWB, RPM and out-of-band ECM. As pointed out earlier, inband EeM will be excluded from this
integration program. On the non-hostile side, the natural environments include lightning and ESD. EMI including
effects on ordinance and hazards constitute the man-made environments. Although some waveform characteristics
vary significantly, there is much overlap in amplitude and frequency. Thus it should be possible to combine some
specifications where certain environments dominate.
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CHALLENGE: PROLIFERATION OF E3 DOCUMENTATION
The large number of electromagnetic environments to be reckoned with is more than matched by the proliferation
of applicable guidelines, standards, and handbooks, over 100 at last count. These documents exhibit redundancy
in requirements and mitigation techniques. In some cases (e.g., ground techniques), guidelines are inconsistent or
imcompatible with each other. Associated with the guidelines is a multitude of separate test requirements and
simulator facilities exhibiting similar redundancies and overlap in environments. These factor provide a strong
motivation to unify the guidance and approach for dealing with E3.

,
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CHALLENGE: PROLIFERATION
OF E3 DOCUMENTATION

AR 70-60
NUCLEAR SURVIVABILITY
AR MY MATERIEL
MIL·STD-483
CONFIGURATION
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
FOR SYSTEMS, ."

MILSTD-1 385B
PRECLUSION OF ORDNANCE
HAZARDS IN
ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS

OPNAVINST 3401.2
NUCLEAR'SURVIVABILITY OF
U,S, NAVY AND U,S, MARINE
CORPS SYSTEMS

AFR 80-38
THE U.S, AI R FORCE
SYSTEMS SURVIVABILITY
PROGR AM
MIL·HDBK-237A
EMC MANAG EMENT
GUIDE FOR PLATFORMS,
SYSTEMS AN D EQUIPMENT

MIL-STO-1377
EFFECTIVENESS OF CA BLE
CONNECTOR AND WEAPON
ENCLOSURE SHIELDING ".

E3 DOC STACK ( I WO 2.
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PROLIFERATION OF E3 DOCUMENTATION
The reduction of the proliferation of E3 documentation can be accomplished by minimizing the number of
standards, by combining existing standards where possible and by making them consistent with each other. This
could include non-DoD standards such as those that may be found under the auspices of the FAA and the mEE.
For example, in the area of EM grounding and bonding considerably different guidelines are provided for
EMIlEMC than would be required for nuclear EMP, that is, single point grounding required for EMIlEMC is not
desirable for EMP.
The second goal is to integrate the E3 related requirements under the applicable 5000 series of directives and
instructions. At present the 5000 series calls out the EM survivability and compatibility requirements separately
and should be combined so that any existing inconsistencies are eliminated.

,,

I,

PROLIFERATION OF
E3 DOCUMENTATION

•

Minimize documentation, combine, and make
consistent

•

Integrate E3 under applicable 5000-Series
documents
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CHALLENGE: OPTIMUM USE OF TEST FACILITIES
Another challenge will be to optimize the use of existing EM test facilities by eliminating those that are redundant
and combining others as necessary. Many of the facilities that exist overlap in capability and should be carefully
reviewed technically and programmatically to ascertain their need. However, a variety of test facilities are required
due to the differing nature of the various EM environments and the fact that not all systems will have the same
EM protection requirements. For example, HPM requires higher power levels than EMI and higher frequencies than
EMP. Lightning and EMP are closer matched from: a spectral point of view but differ in the mode of system
excitation.
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OPTIMUM USE OF TEST FACILITIES
The use of EM test facilities may be optimized by integrating system test requirements and facilities through the
elimination of redundancies and by the eventual centralization and co-location as deemed to be practical.

OPTIMUM USE OF TEST FACILITIES
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•

Integrate test requirements and test facilities

•

Eliminate redundancies

•

Centralize and colocate facilities as deemed
practical
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COMMITMENT TO E3

The DoD, DNA, Services and Joint Offices are committed to the development of systems that are survivable to
modern day E3. Each service has assigned an OPR and associated principal directives that relate to the system E3
problem. In addition, the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center (ECAC) has been assigned as the OPR
for the Joint Services.

COMMITMENT TO E3
•

u.s. Navy I Marines

-

•

OPRs
Principal Directives:

U.S. Army
OPRs:
Principal Directives:

OASA (RDA), USAMC
AAE Memorandum 91-3, ADS-37, TOP-1-1-S11

U.S. Air Force
- OPR:
Principal Directives:

SAF(AQQS), FMA I F~
MIL-STD-1818, AFR 80-23, AFR 80-38

-

•

-

•

NAYAIR, NAVSEA, SPAWARS, MCRDAC
OPNAVINST 3401.3A, OPNAVINST 3401.2

Joint

-

Baker/DNA 10-14-93 WD43

OPR:
Principal Directive:

ECAC
DoDD 3222.3

PROPOSED SOLUTION PATH

The Unified Electromagnetic Effects Workshop has made the case for combined E3. The Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition has designated the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy [ATSD(AE)]
as the OPR for Combined Battlefield Environmental Effects. An Executive Steering Committee charter is now
being defined to be chaired by ATSD(AE). A first order of business for this group will clarification of acquisition
policy as contained in DoD Instruction 5000.2.
A DoD effort is envisioned with top level objectives as follows:
a. To simplify an streamline the acquisition of systems which must withstand multiple E3.
b. To realize cost, weight, and size economies inherent in using the same protection design featurelhardware
to mitigate multiple effects.
Three implementation phases would proceed as follows:

Phase I: The fIrst phase would matrix effects vs. systems categories. System and effects would be rank-ordered
based on amenability to combining and simplifying protection req,*ements. Those systems/effects where the largest
reductions in associated acquisition costs/schedules could be realized would be identified. Phase I would also
include a survey and assessment of existing protection guidance.

Phase II: Efforts in the second phase would pursue the top-ranked matrix blocks where combining effects

requirements produces the largest benefits. The Phase n effort might first produce combined environments
documentation, followed by development of integrated effects protection engineering guidance.

Phase Ill: The third phase would place the protection engineering guidance into the DSSP pipeline to codify the

m

combined guidance into military standards and handbooks. The culmination of Phase
would be Service-ratified
combined protection documentation immediately applicable to system acquisition and maintenance.
DNA has initiated a joint pilot program the Army SSDC to develop combined E3 guidelines for critical groundbased C4I and missile defense systems. This effort has determined the technical feasibility of combined E3 designs
and developed an initial draft guidelines document.
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CONCLUSIONS

•

E3 protection more and more important
Electronics attrition could determine outcome of conflicts
HPRF weapon technology is advancing

•

Need for uniform and consistent E3 protection of U.S. systems

•

EMP hardening offers excellent baseline for unified E3 protection
Have standardized protecti'on I test requirements at
system level
Test results show EMP hardening mitigates other effects

•

DNA has developed and coordinated program approach and
initiated pilot program

•

Integration of commercial and military standards could provide
payoff in cost effectiveness and uniformity of EM protection

•

Payoffs in cost effectiveness, control I audit, uniform EM
protection
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CONCLUSIONS

E3 protection has become critical to war fighting. As we tum more of our command, control, communications,
targeting, and weapon functions over to electronics we must recognize the risks. The technologically advanced
equipment used to provide a decisive advantage is a double-edged sword. Failure to recognize protection
requirements while electronics are advancing can have serious consequences, especially if we continue to rely on
electronics to increase efficiency of our military with smaller numbers. It is conceivable that electronics attrition
could determine the outcome of future conflicts. These problems are exacerbated by the advent of high power
microwave weapon technology.
Our national workshop on Unified EM Effects Hardening pointed to the need for uniform and consistent protection.
EMP protection has been shown to mitigate other electromagnetic effects including lightning and microwaves. Thus
for systems with EMP requirements, an integrated approach should be straightforward, using the conservative EMP
approach as the baseline. For other systems, integration of commercial and military standards could also provide
payoff in cost effectiveness and uniformity of EM protection.
It is generally agreed that combining E3 requirements is technically feasible. The difficult challenge is to define
the process and organize the individual communities and organizations to work together to achieve a coherent and
unified engineering and testing approach and standard documentation.

•

l

,

INTEGRATED E3 PROTECTION
FOR FIXED FACILITY
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INTEGRATED E3 PROTECTION: FIXED FACILITY EXAMPLE

This example depicts common protection engineering features and indicates that each feature mitigates several
electromagnetic effects. Combined effects guidance should specify a balanced protection approach that considers
the effects in toto rather than as individual requirements. Major cost savings can be realized with such an approach
as well as systems with protection that is both complete (no effects overlooked, lost) and balanced (not
overhardened to any particular effects).

•
"

GENERIC EM PROTECTION
ENGINEERING METHOD
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•

Reduce EM coupling by
- Shielding
- Grounding and bonding
- Isolation

•

Reduce transients at equipment using
- Filters
- ESAs
- Clamping diodes

•

Reduce effect on equipment by
- Robust subsystems and piece parts
- Software checks
- Circumvention I reset techniques

"

GENERIC EM PROTECTION ENGINEERING METHOD
There is much commonality among the various electromagnetic disciplines. The same protection engineering tools
apply. The first line of defense is at the system level where EM coupling is reduced by shielding, grounding,
bonding and dielectric isolation. Inside the system, equipment interference is eliminated by the use of filters,
electrical surge arresters (ESAs) and voltage clamps. Effects of spurious electrical effects is further reduced on
internal equipment by the choice of robust subsystems and pieceparts, software checks, and circumvention/reset
techniques.
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PROPOSED SOLUTION PATH
(COORDINATED WITH SERVICES)

Bal:erlDNA

•

Organize and conduct national workshop

•

Identify aSO-level E3 OPR to provide defense-wide policy

•

Clarify aso policy

•

Establish interim E3 protection integration coordination panel

•

Develop integrated E3 protection I testing approach
- DNA pilot program in place for· F.GBC41 and USASDC systems

•

Demonstrate approach on these systems

•

Develop widely applicable technical implementation guidance
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